Wilson and Dilulio provide readers with a mixed point of view on lobbyists, arguing that although many exploit their contact for profit and influence, all are precluded by law from wielding their influence too overtly. Observations from the two-day Washington D.C. trip confirmed this description, suggesting that although strong legal protections are in place, ethical questions about the “revolving door” remain. 

Lobbyists are carefully regulated and defined by law. As Jeffrey Wiener suggests, a lobbyist’s work could easily be one of the “cleanest jobs” in the field of politics. As both Wilson and Dilulio’s The Essential American Government and Wiener indicated, lobbyists must report the names of their clients, “income and expenditures,” and the cases dealt with, and the respective roles played. In addition to this disclosure requirement, the government also sets strong limits on the possibility of the direct exchange of gifts and money between lobbyists and elected officials. Wilson and Dilulio enumerate the precise restrictions on what may be given: “no gift or any value from registered lobbyists or firms that employ lobbyists, no reimbursement for travel costs from registered lobbyists…” Mr. Wiener confirmed this fact during the interaction and also underlined that lobbyists are careful to comply. He also emphasized on the extent to which the regulations are followed in that even the exchange of small items of little value, such as coffee, are not tolerated between lobbyists and elected officials.

Although it is reasonable to conclude that the strong legal protections in place have some effect, it is unclear whether such protections resolve all ethical concerns about the role of lobbying in the legislative process. As Wilson and Dilulio suggest, lobbyists often take advantage of the “revolving door,” which “may give private interests a way of improperly influencing government decisions.” In other words, many in public service working on legislation will find themselves later employed by private firms whose businesses were influenced by that same legislation. There are legitimate questions as to whether the conduct of public officials may be influenced by their expectation of subsequent employment in the private sector. Some lobbyists may exploit the contacts they have gained from working as public servants. Although Mr. Wiener contended that sharp regulations completely exonerated lobbyists from potential blame, it seems that this business of the “revolving door” may raise ethical questions as to what lobbyists might hope to gain from their previous public service, supposedly in the public interest. Mr. Wiener himself worked as a senior legislative advisor to Senator Mary Landrieu from Louisiana on “defense, military, construction, foreign affairs, veterans, and trade policy issues” and for six years before serving as a lobbyist. He now represents major defense and technology contractors.

After the Washington D.C. trip, I came to the conclusion that a lobbyist’s job is fundamentally undemocratic: unelected individuals with no particular claim on the public’s attention should not play so significant a role in the legislative process. Attempting to defend his profession, even Mr. Wiener claimed that his client’s bill regarding the “Golden Hour Blood-bank” was very likely to be passed on account of his own lobbying influence. Given that the United States is both a representative democracy and one that loosely approves the right to petition in its Constitution, I present a resolution: all such petitions must be submitted in writing and published in a weekly digest (the Lobbying Record, akin to the Congressional Record) for the public to see. Oral requests for legislation will be criminalized. This will completely preserve and protect the right to lobby, but eliminate the possibility of undue influence from unelected officials.