While immigration can be seen as an essential feature of our nation, the administrative actions adopted by the executive branch both in the present and past at times fail to respect the boundaries of ethnic equality and legislative norms. In the United States vs. Ju Toy litigation, elimination of bigotry against Asians entailed specifically in the Immigration and Nationality Act was at a constant discrepancy with its application in real cases, in which the procedural precedent and evidentiary supposition performed unequivocally against the Chinese. Regarding the political and historical racist paradigm of administrative orders within the perimeter of immigration and foreign classifications,  it should be noted that this research has a dictation of narrow geographic borderline---the United States. Recently, the order entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” commonly referred to as the Muslim Ban, “purported to bar admission to America of all citizens from Muslim majority countries for 90 days; to bar entry of all refugees from anywhere in the world for 120 days; and to place an indefinite ban on refugees from Syria” (Dreison 1000).  This revealed heavy preference for the Christian perspective and an enforced discrimination against a minority religion. Moreover, consular nonreviewability prohibited the official appeal of visa decisions furnished by consular officers and shielded President Trump from legitimate confrontations of the rational basis test: a legal determination on the sensible relation a regulation has to valid governmental interest. Alternatively, the emphasis of this article must be exclusively attributed to the possibility of expanded inspection the judicial branch is capable of performing with reference to arrangements reached by the executive branch that enabled its racially intolerant practices in the cloak of terrorist prevention. Simultaneously, the central proposition described in this article should also maintain  peaceful coexistence with the notions of the plenary power doctrine and consular nonreviewability. Therefore, the question is how to diminish ethnic discrimination. Above all, the reduction of racism in the United States of America can be accomplished by increasing judicial involvement pertaining immigration and national security measures in pursuit of appraising the constitutionality of executive policy initiatives to the reasonings nominally authorizing them. 

Assuming that judicial relief was resorted to and applied in the United States v. Ju Toy litigation, the racially prejudiced landscape against civilians with Chinese parentage would have been significantly ameliorated in terms of executive rulemaking regarding immigration charges. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, an immigration staff attorney with St. Thomas University's Human Rights Institute and Gulfcoast Legal Services defined the plenary power doctrine as the legislative and executive branch obtaining absolute sovereignty in regulating all aspects of immigration (Rodriguez 218). Particularly, the drastic shift of this case from the legitimacy of Mr. Toy’s citizenship to the appointed decision-maker by statute was in flawless compliance with the plenary power doctrine in which the authority resided completely in executive officials, impermissible for supplementary judiciary counsel. Nonetheless, the plenary power doctrine and the denial of judiciary relief complicated the case United States v. Ju Toy’s compatibility with the Administrative Procedure Act---a confirmation that federal agencies’ statutory proceedings and formal policy establishments are subject to magisterial discretion and the arbitrary and capricious test, which requires evaluation of the reasonableness of federal agencies’ rulemaking allegedly founded upon factual basis and rationale. Indeed, deprived civil liberties of a particular ethnic group experienced during immigration should conjure rigid jurisdictional scrutiny for the purpose of preventing racial antagonism. Constitutional attorney and political scientist Thomas Reed Powell reported at the time that, “[as] the court construes the statute, the jurisdiction of the administration, for all practical purposes, is not conditioned upon citizenship, but is broad enough to deal with all persons of Chinese birth seeking to enter the country” (Powell 361). Generally, extreme interpretation of the plenary power doctrine, immune from judicial review, allows the executive branch to conclude which noncitizens to admit into and deport from the United States in an arbitrary fashion. Actually, this symbolizes the deformities embodying immigration exceptionalism: the compulsory application of a lax “reasonable” standard on racially discriminatory contexts derived from immigration proceedings. Similarly, denying a citizen seeking admission at the border wrongfully merely because of his foreign heritage further mandates judicial oversight on the extent of exerting the plenary power doctrine in accordance with the law. Likewise, immediate and thorough judiciary inspection concerning national security and foreign affairs is necessary when the paucity of proper judgement and confidential sources indicate underlying implications of racial intolerance. Over the past century, the complete lack of judicial discretion has still been continuously occurring as evidenced by the response to Trump’s travel ban. 

To begin with, the federal court should maintain the right to rule on executive orders because, in the case of the Muslim Ban, they did not conform with the boundaries of consular nonreviewability. According to Robert S. Chang, the executive director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law, “the doctrine of consular non-reviewability, [defines] The executive officers whose discretionary decisions are largely insulated from judicial scrutiny” (Chang 1202). To elaborate, it is logical that any evidence asserted by consular officers entitles no leeway for contention or dissent. Under this decree, it is true that foreigners lacking proof of naturalization and residence in the United States comprise a safety burden to the citizens of America. Contrarily, the Muslim Ban exhibits violation of the Establishment Clause due to its denouncement of a minority religious denomination. Even more, it also denotes immigration exceptionalism--- a defect in the mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence which has damaged the foundation of democracy: racial impartiality. On the other hand, a rational basis test designated by statute may rescind this presidential order, for the purpose of adhering to racial uniformity. David M. Driesen, a university professor at Syracuse University College of Law acknowledged the absence of consultation between President Trump, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Justice during the drafting of his first Muslim Ban (Driesen 1048). Initially, judicial discretion acts as a competent channel for the sustenance of racial equality, considering its capacity to forestall President Trump’s apparent intention in breaching the Immigration and Nationality Act by virtue of his personal predilection. By the same token, it is justifiable to argue that this policy was racially motivated since the President has always demonstrated an extremely negative attitude toward the Muslim population. 

Overall, wielding strong executive influence over immigration provoked commensurately prominent judicial opposition analyzing the multifaceted role of forensic audits in our justice system. Above all, the reduction of racism in the United States of America can be accomplished by increasing judicial involvement pertaining immigration and national security measures in pursuit of appraising the constitutionality of executive policy initiatives to the reasonings nominally authorizing them. Ultimately, it is of comparable importance that The Court concentrates both on the scope of constitutional due process of law and juristic investigations of visa verdicts. Subsequently, the American legislative system should conform to the essence of democracy---the sustenance of racial justice on any occasion. Finally, it is to be remembered that if the challenge of racism revolves around a matter of law, the challenge will always be one for the court, and judicial assessment shall be guaranteed. 

Work Cited

Chang, Robert S. “Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases.” Case Western Reserve Law Review, vol. 68, no. 4, Summer 2018, pp. 1183–1222. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=130519666&site=ehost-live.

Driesen, David M. “Judicial Review of Executive Orders’ Rationality.” Boston University Law Review, vol. 98, no. 4, Sept. 2018, pp. 1013–1066. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=132390559&site=ehost-live

Powell, Thomas Reed. “Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Immigration Proceedings.” Harvard Law Review, vol. 22, no. 5, 1909, p. 360., doi:10.2307/1324350.

Rodriguez Kate Aschenbrenner, “Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative Law in the Supreme Court's Immigration Jurisprudence.” 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 215 (2018) scholarship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1244&context=uclr